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INTRODUCTION
The United States’ financial crisis left a massive cleanup bill in its
wake and its victims are still searching for someone to pick up the tab. The
late 2000s saw extensive government involvement in the marketplace,
including direct investment in auto companies and financial institutions.1
In the eye of the storm, shareholders and non-shareholders welcomed, and
even demanded, federal intervention.
As the sky clears, some
commentators are questioning whether the government’s actions were
appropriate.2 Even the beneficiaries of the government’s assistance are
looking for compensation, resulting in public pushback.3
1. See Sharon Silke Carty, After Crash and Government Control, Rebirth for GM,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 17, 2010, 8:10 PM,
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9JI6TKO0.htm (“By June 2009, GM had
filed for bankruptcy. It emerged relieved of most of its debt but mostly owned by the
government and saddled with a damaging nickname: ‘Government Motors.’”).
2. See Gretchen Morgenson, Greenberg Sues U.S. Over A.I.G. Takeover, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 2011, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/22/business/greenbergsues-us-over-aig-takeover.html?_r=0 (“Critics have called the Fed’s decision [to bailout
A.I.G.] a backdoor bailout for prosperous institutions that had dealings with A.I.G. . . .
[These institutions] included Goldman Sachs, the French bank Société Générale and
Deutsche Bank.”).
3. See Matthew Phillips, Forget Gratitude: AIG Considers Suing U.S. Over Bailout,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 8, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-0108/forget-gratitude-aig-considers-suing-u-dot-s-dot-over-bailout (“At the behest of its
former chief executive, Maurice Greenberg, AIG (AIG) is considering joining a lawsuit
filed by its shareholders against the government. . . . Greenberg, 87, will try to persuade the
AIG board that the terms of the company’s $182 billion government bailout were too
onerous, the interest rates were too high, and ultimately, that AIG shareholders got a raw
deal.”).
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These events highlight what Professors Kahan and Rock have called
the “problem of the government as a controlling shareholder.”4 Corporate
law’s traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty appear to be
inapplicable when the United States takes a controlling position in a
company. Not to be dissuaded, Maurice “Hank” Greenberg, former CEO
of American International Group (AIG), has decided to test a novel theory
in court—that AIG’s rescue constituted an unconstitutional taking of
property from AIG and its shareholders’ property5—suing the United States
for, at one point, roughly fifty-five billion dollars.6 Though he has received
some bad press, some observers are applauding Greenberg’s willingness to
find new shareholder protections.7
This Comment analyzes the extent to which the Takings Clause can
protect shareholders from government overreach and fill the void left by
the absence of fiduciary duties. Section I briefly explains the problems
related to government control of a corporation. Section II introduces
takings jurisprudence and discusses the facts of the Starr case, as well as
the takings theory the court applied. Section III applies federal takings law,
informed by the Starr case, to the facts of key fiduciary law cases but
adjusts the facts to include the government as controlling shareholder. The
Comment then compares the results under fiduciary law, primarily
Delaware’s, to the results under the hypothetical takings claims. On
balance, the Takings Clause imposes limitations on the federal shareholder,
but only under narrow conditions, which significantly limit its applicability
relative to the state fiduciary duties and leave the minority shareholder
unprotected.
I. THE PROBLEM OF THE GOVERNMENT AS CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER
The financial crisis saw several instances of government ownership in
firms, from Citigroup to General Motors. The surge in government equity
stakes has displayed the tension between state fiduciary law and federal
law. Several commentators have addressed the issues arising when the
government takes a controlling position in a corporation.8 The problems
4. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling
Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1317 (2011).
5. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 54 (2012).
6. Jonathan Stempel, Greenberg Doubles Claims in AIG Bailout Lawsuit vs U.S. to
$55 Billion, REUTERS, Mar. 12, 2013, 3:42 PM,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/12/us-aig-greenberg-lawsuitidUSBRE92B10H20130312.
7. See Phillips, supra note 3 (“Crass as [Greenberg’s suit] may be, it would be a smart
business move [to return value to shareholders].”).
8. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1295-99 (providing an introduction to the
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stem from a combination of the sovereign immunity of the United States,
federal preemption, and corporate charter politics.
First, “[t]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it
consents to be sued[.]”9 The primary waivers of sovereign immunity stem
from the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),10 the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA),11 and the Tucker Act.12 An extensive discussion of the FTCA
and APA is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, neither statute
provides a promising route to a suit for breach of fiduciary law.13 The
Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity as to claims for money damages
against the United States, and grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of
Federal Claims for claims over ten thousand dollars.14 While this waiver,
like others, does not incorporate state fiduciary law, it is the primary means
to sustain a takings claim against the United States.15
Also, state fiduciary law is unlikely to apply in most cases of
government bailouts, especially when the vehicle for the bailout is a federal
agency. When a lawsuit involves federal entities, such as the Federal
Reserve banks, carrying out congressionally provided powers, federal
common law will normally apply.16 Federal courts will not incorporate
problem); J.W. Verret, Treasury, Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and
Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 299-307 (2010) (using the example of the government’s
Citigroup bailout to explain the problem).
9. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (citing United States v.
Thompson, 98 U.S. 486 (1878), United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), Kansas v.
United States, 204 U.S. 331 (1907), Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 387 (1939),
Kiefer & Kiefer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939), and United States
v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940)).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006).
13. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1325-1346 (discussing the shortcomings of
these statutory regimes).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or
for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviews the decisions of the Court of
Federal Claims.
15. See GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 329 (4th ed.
2006) (“The Tucker Act not only is presumptively available, but also is presumptively the
exclusive vehicle by which to seek compensation for a taking.”).
16. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979) (“Since the
[Small Business Administration and the Farmers Home Administration] derive their
authority to effectuate loan transactions from specific Acts of Congress passed in the
exercise of a ‘constitutional function or power,’ their rights, as well, should derive from a
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state law into those rules of decision “[where the] application of state law
would frustrate specific objectives of . . . federal programs.”17 Given that
instances of government control often result from dire threats to the
national or global economy, a court, either state or federal, is unlikely to
insert itself into a rescue situation and disrupt the federal government’s
goals.18
The politics of corporate charters also plays into the inapplicability of
state fiduciary law. Many states, most importantly Delaware, depend on
the revenue from corporate charter taxes. Congress, however, would be
able to federalize corporate law through the interaction of the Commerce
and Supremacy clauses.19 Even if a plaintiff could drag the United States
before the Delaware Court of Chancery, the court would likely be
unwilling to uphold the plaintiff’s claims as a political matter.20 For these
reasons, the disgruntled minority shareholder is left searching for a creative
avenue for relief. Takings claims present one such option.21
II. TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
This section provides a background in takings law principles and
describes the takings theory presented in Starr Int’l v. United States.22
Synthesizing the sprawling body of takings jurisprudence presents
difficulties for even the most adept commenters,23 but this section provides
federal source.”) (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943)).
17. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 728. In those cases, “[The court] must fashion special rules
solicitous of those federal interests.” Id.
18. See, e.g., Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 906 F. Supp. 2d 202, 214-15
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding Delaware fiduciary law inapplicable on grounds of both federal
common law and as a matter of federal preemption); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to
Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use
of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 744-745 (2009) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Prevent Hard
Cases] (explaining “Delaware’s dilemma” in being caught between disrupting its own
fiduciary law and undercutting the government’s plans for Bear Stearns).
19. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1324 (“Delaware’s franchise-tax business lives
by the grace of the federal government. Congress could, in one fell swoop, wipe out this
business by federalizing corporate law.”) (citing Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117
HARV. L. REV. 588, 600-07 (2004)).
20. See id. (noting that members of Delaware’s judiciary are aware of the state’s
interests — one being to avoid “annoying” the federal government).
21. Other commenters have also discussed the possibility of a takings claim. J.W.
Verret analyzed it briefly and identified some significant shortcomings. Verret, supra note
8, at 308. Kahan and Rock noted the Tucker Act’s cause of action for a takings claim, and
the creative potential for such a claim. Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1341 n. 201.
22. 106 Fed. Cl. 50 (2012).
23. Cf. Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 307, 310 (2007) (“Any effort to distill a body of case law as sprawling as that
construing Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is sure to leave some unsatisfied.”) (internal

MORRIS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

902

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

6/3/14 10:22 AM

[Vol. 16:3

a starting point from which to discuss the Starr case in the Court of Federal
Claims. In that case, the court focuses its analysis on the Penn Central24
factors and provides an indication as to how courts will look at cases of
government ownership in the future.
A. Background Primer on Takings
To understand the nature of these lawsuits, some background in
takings jurisprudence is necessary. The Supreme Court elucidated the
background principle of the Takings Clause in Armstrong v. United
States.25 The constitutional provision “was designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”26 However,
the law must identify important limitations to prevent citizens from
challenging every government action.27 The Fifth Amendment requires
compensation for government action when (1) the government engages in a
taking, which can be either possessory or regulatory, (2) it takes property,
and (3) the taking is for public use.28
Whether the government has crossed the threshold to a taking is often
unclear.29 The classic case of a taking is the physical ousting of a
landowner from his property. For some time, “it was generally thought that
the Takings Clause reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property.”30
The U.S. Supreme Court then developed the concept of a “regulatory
taking” in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon to account for government actions
that are not physical, but nevertheless go “too far.”31 Defining “too far” is
the source of much of the apparent disarray in takings jurisprudence.32 A
footnote omitted).
24. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978).
25. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
26. Id. at 49.
27. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“Government hardly could
go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every change in the general law.”).
28. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 8.4.1, at
656 (4th ed. 2011).
29. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123 (“The question of what constitutes a ‘taking’ for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty.”).
30. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).
31. 260 U.S. at 415 (1922).
32. See id. at 416 (explaining that when a regulation becomes a taking “is a question of
degree — and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions.”); see also David
Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 132 (2010) (noting that “[i]n cases where a
regulatory scheme does not involve a physical invasion or occupation of property, the
Supreme Court has generally been unable to develop any set formula for determining when
justice and fairness require that economic injuries caused by public action result in a
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regulation that results in a permanent physical intrusion into a person’s
property33 or that deprives the owner of all its economic benefits34 are
takings which categorically require compensation. There are, however,
other takings that may fall short of a “total taking”35 but are nevertheless
compensable. To identify those scenarios, the Supreme Court has
identified three factors which have “particular significance”: (1)
“the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant”; (2) “the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations”; and (3) “the character of the
governmental action.”36
If a person acquires property that is encumbered by common law
regulations, then the acquirer may not challenge the regulation as a
taking.37 The potential takings claims resulting from governmentcontrolled companies would likely present this last, Penn Central-type
claim.
In certain cases, the court will ask whether the burdens the
government imposes on the citizen’s property are roughly proportionate to
the government’s interest in the regulation. In Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, the government required a landowner to grant the public an
easement to access a beach as a condition for a building permit.38 The
Court held that the regulation went beyond the government’s police power.
It could, for example, require certain development standards so that the
building would not affect the beach. The easement requirement imposed
by the municipality, however, resulted in a “permanent physical
occupation.”39 Later, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court clarified the
test.40 First, courts should ask whether there is a “nexus . . . between a
legitimate state interest and the permit condition” created by the city.41
Then, courts ask whether there is “rough proportionality” between the
compensable taking.”) (internal quotations omitted).
33. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (“When
faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupation of real property,
this Court has invariably found a taking.”).
34. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
35. Id. at 1030.
36. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1986)
(quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978)). But see
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (criticizing the imprecision in analyzing the diminution in the
value of the property interest).
37. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 640 n.3 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring
and dissenting).
38. 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987).
39. Id. at 831.
40. 512 U.S. 374, 383-88 (1994).
41. Id. at 386 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837).
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development exactions and the government’s interest in regulation.42 To
meet that standard, the government must show “some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development.”43 This rule appears
useful to Starr and other shareholders requesting scrutiny of government
ownership. Courts, however, have not applied the test outside the context
of land use exactions. As discussed later, the Court of Federal Claims was
unwilling to extend the rule outside those boundaries in Starr.44
The second criterion, whether what the government has taken was
property, refers to the whole of the “group of rights inhering in the citizen’s
relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of
it.”45 Traditionally, the court looks to “existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law to define the . . .
interests that qualify for protection . . . under the [Takings Clause].”46
Value alone is not sufficient to provide property status.47 Rather, the court
determines “whether or not the alleged property had the hallmark rights of
transferability and excludability, which indicia are part of an individual’s
bundle of property rights.”48 These definitions of property impose a
significant limitation on the extent to which takings will be able to replicate
fiduciary law.
Finally, the government takes property for public use when it uses the
property for a “legitimate purpose of government” and the use of the
property to achieve that goal is rational.49 Importantly, the Fifth
Amendment itself does not prohibit the public taking in the first place, but
requires only adequate compensation.50 While the government may not
merely take a private person’s property and transfer it to another private
party, even if it fairly compensates the first party,51 the government may

42. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388.
43. Id. at 391.
44. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 82 (2012).
45. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
46. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (internal quotations
omitted).
47. Lack of market value, however, does not preclude property status. Phillips v.
Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 157 (1998).
48. Members of Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323,
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
49. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984).
50. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., Cal.,
482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987) (“[The Takings Clause] does not prohibit the taking of private
property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.”).
51. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (“[I]t has long been
accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of
transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.”).
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take one’s private property for a public use as long as the government
adequately compensates the party who was deprived of her property.52
Some history may suggest that there might be an exception to the Takings
Clause in times of emergency, but those cases were not readily accepted at
the time and have been largely rejected today.53 Starr presents the case of
government intervention in the market for the purpose of stabilizing a
financial system on the point of collapse. In at least one of the alleged
takings, the Government transferred property to a private party.54 The
government cannot shield itself with an emergency exception. Even if the
Court of Federal Claims finds a taking, it will not completely reverse the
government’s action, but it may require the government to compensate
shareholders.
B. Relevant Facts in Starr
The Starr case arose from the government’s bailout of AIG in the fall
of 2008, as the country was in the midst of what has been dubbed the
“Great Recession.”55 AIG’s struggles arose from their credit default swap
business and resulting collateral risk. The resulting liquidity problems and
collapse disrupted the financial markets and the government intervened
after private arrangements failed. The government provided a loan to AIG
and received an equity stake in the company and also provided for the
winding up of some of AIG’s outstanding derivative contracts.56

52. Id. at 477.
53. Compare United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 153 (1952)
(finding no taking where “the sole objective of destroying property of strategic value to
prevent the enemy from using it to wage war more successfully”), with Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (requiring compensation “no matter how
minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it”) and United
States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115-17 (1951) (finding a taking in the confiscation
of a coal mine, even though it was war time); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 66162 (discussing these cases in more detail).
54. See infra II.C.3.b. for the description of the Maiden Lane III transactions.
55. See Bernard Condon & Paul Wiseman, AP IMPACT: Recession, Tech Kill MiddleClass Jobs, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 23, 2013,
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2013-01-23/ap-impact-recession-tech-kill-middle-classjobs (“Five years after the start of the Great Recession, the toll is terrifyingly clear: Millions
of middle-class jobs have been lost in developed countries the world over.”).
56. For additional overviews of the AIG bailout, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, FINANCIAL CRISIS: REVIEW OF FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. (2011), [hereinafter GAO REPORT] and William K.
Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (2009).
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1. AIG’s Credit Default Swap Business and its Collateral Risk
The collapse of the real estate market and the resulting Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy shook the foundations of many financial institutions,
including AIG. As 2008 began, AIG and its subsidiaries were writing
$47.1 billion in net premiums, employed approximately 116,000 people,57
and serviced more than seventy-six million customers.58 AIG remains a
massive organization of subsidiaries that provides life insurance and
financial planning services to institutions and individual customers in over
130 countries.59
AIG, like many other financial institutions, entered into derivative
contracts through a subsidiary, AIG Financial Products (AIGFP), to insure
its clients’ financial transactions.60 One such derivate contract is a credit
default swap (CDS), wherein AIG assumed the risk of default on a set of
debt securities.61 Some of these CDSs referenced collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs), structured investment products which themselves
referenced other assets, commonly fixed-income assets.62 These underlying
assets often included the now infamous mortgage-backed securities
(MBSs) exposed to subprime mortgage debt.63 Swap contracts generally
require counterparties to deliver collateral to one another as the value of the
underlying assets changes. The collateral requirement of the CDS contracts
posed an additional liquidity risk to AIG beyond the risk of outright
default.64
2. Financial Collapse and AIG’s Ensuing Liquidity Problems
AIG’s risk exposure soared as the real estate market collapsed in 2007
and the resulting global financial crisis took hold. As of December 31,

57. Am. Int’l Group, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Feb. 28, 2008) [hereinafter
AIG Form 10-K 2008].
58. Actions
Related
to
AIG,
FED.
RESERVE
BANK
OF
N.Y.
3,http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/aig/index.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
59. Am. Int’l Group, Preliminary Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus Dated June 29,
2012 (Final Prospectus Supplement), at S-1 (Aug. 3, 2012).
60. Am. Int’l Group, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 132 (Mar. 2, 2009) [hereinafter
AIG Form 10-K 2009]. As with traditional insurance contracts, AIG would receive periodic
payments, though that is where the similarities end.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 132-34; GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 5.
63. AIG Form 10-K 2008, supra note 57, at 122.
64. See id. (“Certain of these credit derivatives are subject to collateral posting
provisions.”). These contracts require parties to deliver to one another marketable assets, if
not solely cash or cash equivalents, which can cause massive liquidity strain.
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2007, AIGFP held $527 billion in notional value of credit default swaps.65
Of that amount, seventy-nine billion dollars in notional were “multi-sector
CDOs” containing $61.4 billion in exposure to domestic subprime
mortgages.66 AIG reported an unrealized market valuation loss of over
eleven billion dollars that year.67 “In the second half of 2008, AIG
experienced an unprecedented strain on liquidity” driven, in part, by
collateral calls from AIGFP’s CDO counterparties.68 Starr contends that,
during this time, the government withheld access to the Federal Reserve’s
discount window even as it provided access to other institutions.69 On
September 15, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for bankruptcy,
sending shock waves through the financial system.70 The following day
AIG failed to secure a private solution to its liquidity problems.71
3. The Government’s Deal with AIG
The terms of the rescue form the core of the Starr litigation. The
government’s deal with AIG involved both (a) a loan from the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and (b) the government receiving a
sizable equity stake in AIG. It also involved the closing of certain
outstanding derivative contracts. Starr has argued that each of these
provisions constituted a government taking.
a. FRBNY’s Loan Facility and Equity Stake
On September 16, 2008, the government offered AIG access to the
Federal Reserve discount window on specific terms.72 The government
offered AIG: (a) an FRBNY revolving credit facility to AIG of eighty-five
billion dollars, secured by AIG’s assets, (b) a requirement that the
government be given control of AIG as controlling lender and controlling
shareholder, and (c) a provision that the government receive nearly an

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. AIG Form 10-K 2009, supra note 60, at 40. S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch all
downgraded AIG’s long-term debt on September 15, 2008. Id.
69. Verified Class Action Complaint at ¶ 42, Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed.
Cl. 50 (2012) (No. 11-779C) [hereinafter Complaint].
70. Kristina Cooke, US STOCKS - Wall Street Mauled by Lehman Bankruptcy, AIG
Fears, REUTERS, Sept. 15, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/09/15/markets-stocksidUKN1529545420080915.
71. AIG Form 10-K 2009, supra note 60, at 4. For a more detailed timeline of events
leading up to the Government’s action, see GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 14.
72. GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 7-8.
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eighty percent stake in AIG.73 AIG and the FRBNY signed a Credit
Agreement on September 22, 2008, consistent with those terms.74 A trust
was established to which AIG would make interest payments and to which
AIG issued Series C Preferred Stock convertible to common stock.75 AIG
was to receive five hundred thousand dollars in purchase price for these
shares “with an understanding that additional and independently sufficient
consideration was also furnished to AIG by the [FRBNY] in the form of its
lending commitment.”76 The preferred stock was issued to a trust
established for the sole benefit of the United States Treasury.77 Although
the ownership stake would permit the trust “to elect all of AIG’s
directors,”78 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
found that the government did not manifest its control of AIG.79
AIG and the Trust signed a subsequent Stock Purchase Agreement to
facilitate the conversion of the preferred stock to common shares.80 There

73. Id. at 7-8, 102 n.136.
74. Credit Agreement Between American International Group, Inc., Borrower, and
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Lender 1 (Sept. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/aig/pdf/original_credit_agreement.pdf [hereinafter
Credit Agreement].
75. AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement Among Federal Reserve Bank of New York.,
and Jill M. Considine, Chester B. Feldberg & Douglas L. Foshee, Trustees 1 (January 16,
2009), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2009/AIGCFTAgreement.pdf
[hereinafter Trust Agreement]; see also Press Release, Am. Int’l Group, AIG Notice (Sept.
26, 2008), http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/76/76115/releases/092608a.pdf
(noting that the preferred stock would be convertible to common stock “following a special
shareholders meeting to amend AIG’s restated certificate of incorporation”); The A.I.G.
Bailout Takes Shape, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Sept. 24, 2008, 9:23 AM,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/the-aig-bailout-takes-shape/ (outlining the terms of
AIG’s deal with FRBNY); A.I.G.: So Many Questions, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Sept. 18,
2008, 10:46 AM, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/aig-so-many-questions/
(detailing some of the legal questions pertaining to the AIG’s deal).
76. Am. Int’l Grp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 10 (May 7, 2009).
77. AIG Form 10-K 2009, supra note 60, at 26.
78. Id. at 27. The Trust Agreement provided that the trustees controlling the stock
would have the “exclusive right to vote the Trust Stock.” Trust Agreement, supra note 75,
at 6. Additionally, the Agreement prohibited the Trustees from voting “to elect . . . as
members of the board of directors of [AIG] only persons who are not, and have not been
within one year of their nomination, officers, directors, or senior employees of the FRBNY
or the Treasury Department.” Id. at 7.
79. Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 906 F. Supp. 2d 202, 252 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
80. Series C Perpetual, Convertible, Participating Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement
Between AIG Credit Facility Trust and American International Group (March 1, 2009),
available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012309003734/y74794exv10w91.htm
.
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was, however, one snag in this plan. AIG’s certificate of incorporation did
not authorize enough common shares to convert the government’s preferred
shares.81 The charter only authorized five billion common shares, of which
around three billion had been issued or reserved.82 According to Starr, only
about 40% of the Government’s shares could be issued on the conversion.83
Under Delaware law, an increase in the number of authorized shares
requires a shareholder vote, with common shareholders voting as a class, to
amend the charter.84
The shareholders had an opportunity to vote on proposals to amend
the charter to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock at
the June 30, 2009 meeting.85 The vote to increase the number of authorized
shares failed with the common stockholders voting as a separate class. The
proxy statement, however, also contained a proposal “to effect a reverse
stock split of AIG’s outstanding common stock at a ratio of one-fortwenty.”86 The reverse stock split passed with the government’s controlling
vote participating.87 The split reduced the number of issued common
shares to 150 million, thereby leaving around 4.85 billion shares authorized

81. See Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of American International
Group, Inc. 2 (June 30, 2009) (authorizing 5.1 billion shares). This issue did not hamper the
issuance of the preferred shares because AIG had a “blank check” provision in their charter
for preferred share issuance. Id. at 2-4.
82. Id. at 2; American International Group, Proxy Statement 65 (June 5, 2009),
available at http://www.aig.com/Chartis/internet/US/en/2009proxy_tcm3171-440898.pdf
[hereinafter Proxy Statement].
83. Complaint, supra note 69, at ¶ 97.
84. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (West 2014).
85. See Proxy Statement, supra note 82, at 64–70 (explaining proposed amendments to
AIG’s Certificate of Incorporation). In that proxy card, AIG stated, “[t]he primary purpose
of the reverse stock split is to increase the per share trading price of AIG Common Stock.”
Id. at 66.
86. American International Group, Notice to Annual Meeting of Shareholders to be
Held June 30, 2009 (June 5, 2009), available at
http://www.aig.com/Chartis/internet/US/en/2009proxy_tcm3171-440898.pdf. A reverse
stock split accomplishes two goals: reducing the number of outstanding shares and
increasing the per share stock price. This proposal meant, for example, that a holder of
twenty common shares would receive one share after the split. Generally, there is no
economic effect of a stock split, as the company’s value has not changed, although
frequently there are financial justifications for engaging in such a maneuver. Cf. Michael
Russnow, AIG Proposed Reverse Stock Split: Shareholders Should Vote This Down as a NoBrainer, HUFFINGTON POST, June 27, 2009, 5:42 AM,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-russnow/aig-proposed-reverse-stoc_b_221801.html
(mentioning the potential for new issuance and dilution).
87. See Lila Zuill, AIG Reverse Stock Split Fails to Boost Shares, REUTERS, July 1,
2009, http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/07/01/idINN0149895120090701 (noting the
occurrence of the reverse stock split and commenting on subsequent drop in AIG’s share
price).
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and unissued.88 The government converted its preferred shares on January
14, 2011, at the closing of the Recapitalization Plan.89 Starr contends that
this conversion “completed” the government’s taking of the shareholders’
economic and voting interest in their shares.90 The Trust went on to
appoint eight of AIG’s twelve directors by November 2011.91 From then
until September 2012, the Government significantly wound down its
position in AIG, though the board composition had not changed through
June 26, 2013.92
b. Maiden Lane III Transactions
Apart from the reverse stock split and subsequent conversion to
common shares, Starr also complained of the government’s “backdoor
bailouts” of AIG’s counterparties.93 The FRBNY had created a special
purpose fund, Maiden Lane III (ML III), to resolve issues related to AIG’s
CDS contracts.94 FRBNY debated three capital structures for ML III: (1)
AIG contributes equity, and FRBNY contributes a loan to fund ML III’s
purchase of the underlying CDOs; (2) AIG contributes equity, and both
FRBNY and AIG’s counterparties contribute a loan to fund the CDO
purchase; and (3) AIG contributes equity, and FRBNY contributes a
guarantee to secure ML III’s guarantee of any CDO contracts that might
default.95 The latter two options likely would have cost less for AIG in the
end, but would have required significant negotiations with AIG’s
counterparties.96 Ultimately, FRBNY decided on the first option. AIG
contributed five billion dollars in equity, to be exhausted first, and FRBNY
provided $24.3 billion in a loan facility.97 ML III then purchased the
underlying CDO contracts for par value (face value of the contract), less
the collateral protection already posted by AIG.
88. Proxy Statement, supra note 82, at 65.
89. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., New York Fed Ends AIG Assistance
with Full Repayment (Jan. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/aboutthefed/2011/oa110114.html; see also
AIG Recapitalization: Summary of Terms of September 30, 2010 1 (Sept. 2010), available
at http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/aig/pdf/Recapitalization_Summary_Terms.pdf
(authorizing the conversation).
90. Complaint, supra note 69, at ¶ 101.
91. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 459, 466 (2013) [hereinafter Starr Int’l
Co. II].
92. Id. at 465.
93. Complaint, supra note 69, at ¶ 103.
94. Id. at ¶ 112.
95. GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 59.
96. See id. at 61 (discussing the relative merits of each structure).
97. Id. at 64.
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Accounts differ as to how this decision to pay par value was made,98
but some matters are clear. FRBNY had contacted some of AIG’s
counterparties to discuss a discount purchase price for the CDOs. After
initial pushback from the counterparties, FRBNY ultimately offered to
purchase the assets at par value without a loan contribution from the
counterparties. According to a U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report, “[t]he counterparties’ differing situations and varying
perceptions of the benefit of ML III participation might have offered an
opportunity to lower the amount FRBNY lent to ML III if FRBNY had
been able to negotiate individually with the counterparties based on their
individual circumstances.”99 FRBNY officials were concerned with having
a deal in place before the November 10, 2008 target date.100 Engaging in
lengthy discount negotiations would mean risking additional collateral
requirements, credit downgrades, and further market disruption.101 One
official noted that “any further downgrades to AIG’s long-term credit
rating would have been catastrophic and would most likely have led to an
AIG bankruptcy.”102 Officials were also concerned about the propriety of
the FRBNY pushing for discounts, the valuation of an appropriate discount
from par, and the FRBNY’s lack of bargaining power in the negotiations.103
Starr maintains that the FRBNY decision to forgo concessions from
AIG counterparties and to pay close to par value for the CDOs constituted a
taking. The complaint refers to these payments as “backdoor bailouts” to
the financial institutions on the other side of the contracts.104 The Special
Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP)
addressed the issue in a November 17, 2009 report. It recognizes that thenPresident of FRBNY Timothy Geithner and FRBNY’s general counsel
denied any intent to facilitate a bailout of AIG’s counterparties. The report
maintains:
[i]rrespective of their stated intent, however, there is no question
that the effect of FRBNY’s decisions—indeed, the very design of
the federal assistance to AIG—was that tens of billions of dollars
of Government money was funneled inexorably and directly into
AIG’s counterparties.105
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See id. at 72 (detailing the much different stance of AIG’s counterparties).
Id. at 85.
Id. at 73.
Id.
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLE ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
FACTORS AFFECTING EFFORTS TO LIMIT PAYMENTS TO AIG COUNTERPARTIES 13 (2009)
[hereinafter SIGTARP REPORT].
103. GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 73-74.
104. Complaint, supra note 69, ¶ 103.
105. SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 102, at 30.
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C. The Takings Theory in Starr International
Starr presents a unique way of looking at takings claims as a
substitute for the lack of fiduciary protections. The particular facts of the
case are critical to understanding the court’s opinion on the Government’s
motion to dismiss. The takings claims principally stem from two sources:
(1) the government’s acquisition of AIG’s common stock; and (2) certain
transactions with AIG’s swap counterparties. The court’s opinion largely
turns on the definition of property and when the plaintiff can claim the
government took that property. The court’s method of analyzing this case
provides an important example for the potential replication of fiduciary
claims in other circumstances of government ownership.
1. Arguments in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
Starr filed both direct and derivative claims in the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims on November 21, 2011, arguing that the United States had
violated its and AIG’s rights under the Due Process, Equal Protection, and
Takings Clauses.106 Only the takings claims are relevant here. Starr argued
that the government required AIG to convey a 79.9% equity stake in the
company without adequate compensation to common shareholders, the
government allegedly took advantage of the market conditions to coerce
AIG into the Credit Agreement, and AIG received only $500,000 for the
Series C Preferred Shares, which had a market value of about twenty-three
billion dollars.107 Half of a million dollars was not adequate compensation
for the preferred shares, even taking into account the government’s loan.
The government had already received adequate compensation for the loan,
because AIG had agreed to pay 14.5% in interest (a rate well above market
rates and discount rates charged to other financial institutions) and fully
secured the loan with AIG’s assets.108 Since AIG had already supplied
consideration for the loan, it was effectively uncompensated for the
additional equity stake, thus constituting an unconstitutional taking. Starr
argued that the reverse stock split and subsequent conversion “completed”
the government’s taking of the shareholders’ property109 in what it called a
“backdoor conversion[.]”110
In addition, Starr argued that the ML III transactions were executed
for the purpose of bailing out AIG’s counterparties, many of whom were
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 54 (2012).
Id. at 56-57.
Id. at 57.
Complaint, supra note 69, ¶ 101.
Id. at ¶ 103.
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other major financial institutions.111
Starr maintains that FRBNY
controlled and managed the ML III.
FRBNY allowed AIGFP’s
counterparties to retain the entirety of the collateral posted to ML III and
paid par value to cancel the CDS contracts, in order to effect a “backdoor
bailout” of those counterparties.112 Starr maintains that these contracts
could have been cancelled for far less cost to AIG.113 Once the CDOs were
in the ML III fund, FRBNY received the majority of the returns despite the
fact that AIG funded “approximately [sixty percent] of the par value
purchase price” through its collateral posting and five billion dollars in
equity.114
The ML III structure contained a “waterfall” provision
specifying that the proceeds from the transactions would first pay for ML
III’s expenses, then to repay the FRBNY’s loan to ML III.115 Any “residual
interests” were to be split between FRBNY, which was to receive twothirds of the proceeds, and AIG, which was to receive the remaining
third.116 Because the two-thirds share was provided after the loan and
expenses were already paid to the government, Starr alleges that FRBNY
appropriated two-thirds of those residual interests without justification.117
The government first argued, on motion to dismiss, that Starr had not
adequately specified what events constituted a taking.118 Starr’s argument
that the government’s actions in the “aggregate” constituted a taking was
not an adequate pleading because it could not specify when the taking took
place.119 Next, the government argued that its actions were not of the sort
necessary to state a taking claim. In its view, there are only two kinds of
takings: (1) “physical invasion or appropriation of private property,” and
(2) takings resulting from unduly burdensome regulations.120 A physical
taking means “required acquiescence [where] the owner is forced to
surrender the property under threat of legal sanction.”121 AIG freely
accepted the government’s offer of an eighty-five billion dollar loan instead
of enduring a likely bankruptcy. A taking does not follow from the fact
that turning down the terms of the government’s offer would entail
111. Id. at ¶ 103-108 (referencing statements from former Treasury Secretary Robert
Paulson, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner,
and then-AIG CEO Edward Liddy).
112. Id. at ¶ 131-32.
113. Id. at ¶ 117.
114. Id. at ¶ 121.
115. Id. at ¶ 118.
116. Id. at ¶ 119
117. Id. at ¶ 121.
118. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 24, Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl.
50 (2012) (No. 11-779C) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss].
119. Id.
120. Id. at 26.
121. Id. at 27 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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substantial sacrifice or disadvantage.122 Although Starr alleged adverse
action from the government if the offer had been rejected, any compulsion
AIG felt was created by its own business risks, not by the government.123
The government, furthermore, rejected the contention that it had compelled
AIG to accept its terms, maintaining that AIG’s decision “was an exercise
of business judgment, not an involuntary action.”124 Compensating AIG for
the risks it created would run counter to the Armstrong justification for
takings claims.125 Moreover, the conversion itself cannot be a taking
because AIG received preferred shares in exchange for giving AIG
common shares to the government.126 Regarding the ML III claims, the
government argued that Starr failed to allege what the government did to
cause the transactions. AIG consented to the establishment of the ML III
vehicle and took the financing to complete the transactions.127
Furthermore, the government disputed the fact that it took a property
interest from either Starr or AIG. It argued that neither Starr nor AIG
possessed a property right in the FRBNY’s loan or “a loan based upon any
particular terms.”128 FRBNY had no obligation to provide a loan to AIG,
only the discretion to provide it, so no property interest could attach.129
Likewise, FRBNY could have legally denied access to any loan. Also, the
statute authorizing FRBNY to make loans does not specify particular terms
for those loans.130
As to Starr’s property interests, the government argued, Starr lost
nothing because it retains its shares in AIG. Even if the government’s
conversion to common shares diminished shareholders’ value, Starr’s
common stock does not entitle it to a certain value or percentage share in
the corporation, so it did not possess a property interest.131 Furthermore,
122. Id. at 27-28 (citing Cal. Hous. Sec., Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 955, 959 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); Evans v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 554, 558-64 (2006), aff’d, 250 Fed. App’x
321 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Turntable Fishery & Moorage Corp. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 256,
263 (2002)).
123. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 118, at 29. The government argued that “[i]t has
become settled law that the mere stress of business conditions will not constitute duress
where the defendant was not responsible for those circumstances.” Id. (internal quotations
and citation omitted).
124. Id. at 30.
125. Id. at 31. The government argued that “[t]he rescue of AIG cannot be distorted into
a taking” because fairness does not require that losses resulting from the rescue be borne by
the public when a private party is the intended beneficiary of the rescue. Id.
126. Id. at 32.
127. Id. at 33.
128. Id. at 34.
129. Id. at 34-35 (citing Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 2012 WL
148692, at *1-2 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
130. Id. at 35-36 (citing Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006)).
131. Id. at 37 (citing Broad v. Sealaska Corp., 85 F.3d 422, 430 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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although Starr alleges that the government took control of AIG, Starr’s
common stock interest did not include the right to prevent another party
from taking control or from diluting the common shares.132 In that way,
Starr’s interest did not include the right to exclude — a fundamental
property right.133 Finally, any business or investment interest that Starr
may have had in the value of the shares was merely a collateral interest,
which cannot form the basis for a takings claim.134
Likewise, the government did not take a property interest during the
ML III transactions. Starr failed to allege that it or AIG owned the ML III
proceeds that it says the government took. The government characterized
ML III as merely an obligation for AIG to pay money, which does not
support the notion that it is a property interest.135 Any “residual interest”
that AIG may have received was merely “an abstract sum of money
potentially capable of being counted,” rather than a vested property right.136
Furthermore, the government argued that AIG never had a right to receive
any more than one-third of the residual interests in ML III. Therefore, even
if the residual interests were property rights, the government did not take
them.137
2. Suit in the Court of Federal Claims
In January 2012, the Court of Federal Claims issued an opinion on the
government’s motion to dismiss.138 The court granted the motion to
dismiss as to the Due Process and Equal Protection claims. Critically,
however, the court denied the motion as to the takings claims, with few
exceptions.139 The court found that Starr had identified the taking itself
with adequate specificity. First, the government “imposed” the Credit
Agreement on AIG in order to take the preferred stock.140 Second, the
reverse stock split diluted the common stock, taking the majority control
132. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 118, at 37.

133. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing
the right to exclude others as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property”).
134. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 118, at 38.
135. Id. at 39.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 40.
138. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 50 (2012). Starr also filed a claim
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. That complaint was
dismissed for failure to state a claim. Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 906 F.
Supp. 2d 202, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
139. Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 55. The court also denied any claims that would be
duplicative of one another. Id.
140. Id. at 68.
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from the common shareholders.141 Third, Starr had established that the ML
III transactions constituted a taking.142 Finally, the conversion of the
preferred shares to common shares “completed the Government’s
taking.”143 This last alleged taking could not be meritorious if the second
allegation is valid, since the equity interest would already have been taken.
Therefore, the court only recognized three alleged takings here.144
a. Economic and voting interests of AIG common shareholders
The Court of Federal Claims found a property interest in the economic
and voting powers of the AIG common shares.145 Notably, the U.S.
Constitution does not define the property interests protected by the Fifth
Amendment.146
“[B]ackground principles and existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . .
define the range of interests that qualify for protection as property under
the Fifth Amendment.”147 The court analyzed the transferability and
excludability of common shares, as these qualities are “part of an
individual’s bundle of property rights.”148 Delaware law supports the
transferability of the equity and voting power of common shares.149
Exclusion was a more complicated matter. Some scholars have
considered the right to exclude the most important or even the sole
condition for a property interest.150 The court defined the issue as whether
common shareholders had a right to prevent dilution of their shares
“through a separate class vote or otherwise . . . .”151 Delaware corporate
law does not guarantee common shareholders a class-wise vote on the
reverse stock split. Starr claimed, however, that AIG had represented
before the Court of Chancery that the common shareholders would have a
separate vote on any proposal affecting the number of authorized shares or

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 69 (internal quotations omitted).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 75.
146. Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
147. Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 72 (internal quotations omitted).
148. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
149. Id. at 73 (citing Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 25 (Del. Ch. 1982), which held
that “Delaware law has for quite some time permitted stockholders wide latitude in
decisions affecting the restriction or transfer of voting rights.”).
150. See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *2 (defining property as “that
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external thing of
the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”).
151. Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 73.
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the par value of common shares.152 The Court of Federal Claims
interpreted the Court of Chancery’s order to mean that the shareholders
maintained protection from the dilution of their shares as well.153 On this
basis, the court determined that AIG’s shareholders had a cognizable right
to exclude vested in their common shares.154
In addition to these interests, the Court of Federal Claims found
Delaware case law to support a cognizable property interest in equity and
voting power.155 The court cited a series of Delaware cases involving
equity dilution, where a controlling or influential shareholder causes the
corporation to issue stock for inadequate consideration, thereby diluting the
economic value of all the shares.156 In those cases, Delaware has sustained
a dual, direct, and derivative breach of fiduciary duty claim “premised on
the theory that the corporation, by issuing additional stock for inadequate
consideration, made the complaining stockholder’s investment less
valuable.”157 The court considered these cases as further evidence of a
property right in the equity value of common shares. As for the voting
power of the shares, the court also found Delaware cases supporting a
protected property interest.158 For the foregoing reasons, the court found a
cognizable property right in the economic and voting interest in the AIG
common shares.159 Either through the Share Agreement or the subsequent
reverse stock split, Starr identified a taking of that property interest.160
b. Collateral Posted by AIG
Starr asserted in a derivative action that AIG could have negotiated
down the value of the collateral posted to its counterparties from face
value. The government, according to Starr, directed AIG to give up the full
value of that collateral, $32.5 billion in cash, rather than negotiate the value
to around sixty percent of the value.161 In Starr’s view, this constituted a
152. Id.
153. Id. The court disclaimed any final determination on the shareholder’s right to a
vote on the reverse stock split, but assumed the truth of the allegations. Id. at 73-74.
154. Id. at 74.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing Feldman v. Cutaia, 951 A.2d 727 (Del. 2008); Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 925
A.2d 1265 (2007); Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 (2006); In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc.
Litig., 634 A.2d 319 (1993)).
157. Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 74 (internal quotations omitted).
158. Id. at 75 (citing In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig., 747 A.2d 71, 81
(Del. Ch. 1999) and Oliver v. Bos. Univ., 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *76 (2006)).
159. Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 75.
160. Id. This claim, as far as it constituted a derivative claim, was later dismissed as
discussed below. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 459, 466 (2013).
161. Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 75.
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taking. The court decided that the collateral would be a property interest
subject to Fifth Amendment protection, although it held the question of the
parties’ ownership of those rights for the fact-finding stage.162 AIG had
posted the collateral to secure specific swap transactions. While general
obligations to pay money do not constitute an unconstitutional taking of
property, “[A] specific sum of money, ‘derived from ownership of
particular deposits in an established account,’ is a protectable property
interest under the Fifth Amendment.”163 There may not have been any
separate account in which counterparties held the collateral, but the court
considered the pledge of security to create a “constructive account.”164
Additionally, the fact that the parties could transfer the collateral pursuant
to the ML III transactions supported its property status.165 The court
ultimately decided that AIG had alleged a property interest in the difference
between par value and the potentially lower negotiated value, which Starr
could put forth in a derivative action.166
c. Voluntariness of the transactions
The government argued that AIG and the shareholders consented to
the transactions at issue, thereby foreclosing a taking claim.167 The court
had already found that the reverse stock split was not executed with the
previously promised shareholder vote,168 and so it held that the shareholders
did not consent to the reverse stock split.169 The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York had found that Starr did not plead adequate
control by the government, largely because the government did not
formally control AIG’s board of directors.170 Starr, therefore, had to argue
that the government obtained de facto control through coercive dealings
with AIG’s management. Starr had argued that FRBNY had restricted
AIG’s access to its discount window while taking an aggressive stance in
162. Id.
163. Id. at 75-76 (citing Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327,
1339-40) (quoting Adams v. United States, 391 F.3d 1212, 1224-25 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
164. Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 76.
165. Id. (citing Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 669 F.3d 1326, 1330
(Fed. Cir. 2012), which recognized that a core indicator of a property right is the “ability to
sell, assign, transfer, or exclude.”).
166. Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 76. These claims, as discussed below, were later
dismissed for lack of standing. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 459, 469
(2013).
167. Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 76.
168. Id. at 74.
169. Id. at 77.
170. Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 906 F. Supp. 2d 202, 255 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
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negotiations.171 The court found that Starr had adequately pleaded the
government’s coercion in the acceptance of the loan agreement.172
However, the court left open the issue of whether the loan agreement was
the result of AIG’s own risky business practices, such that the public
should not have to bear the burden of its bailout.173 Furthermore, the court
did not decide the matter of the voluntariness of the ML III transactions
because of the factual issues involved.174
d. Rough Proportionality Test
Starr additionally argued that the court should apply Dolan’s “rough
proportionality” test,175 but the court refused to apply it in this case.176 Starr
maintained that AIG already provided adequate consideration for the loan
with the high interest rate and the security in AIG’s assets. The additional
equity stake made the compensation disproportionate.177 In other words,
what AIG’s shareholders received in the transaction was disproportionately
smaller than what they gave up. Although the test seems to align well with
the facts of the case, the court declined to expand the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence by applying the test outside the context of land use
exactions.178 Furthermore, the court stated that the factual predicates for
the rough proportionality test were not present. The test requires that the
government impose a choice between the offered deal and some exertion of
regulatory power, such as declining a permit to develop a property.179
Therefore, the court found that Starr cannot sustain a takings claim based
on the rough proportionality test.
e. Dismissal of Derivative Claims
On April 5, 2013, AIG, as nominal defendant, filed a motion to
171. Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 56.
172. Id. at 79.
173. Id. at 79-80.
174. Id. at 80; see also Ben Prostess & Michael J. De La Merced, Rescued by a Bailout,
A.I.G. May Sue Its Savior, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Jan. 7, 2013, 10:30 PM,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/rescued-by-a-bailout-a-i-g-may-sue-its-savior/
(discussing the fact-intensive forthcoming trial, in preparation for which Starr is “[s]eeking
[sixteen] million pages in documents from the government.”).
175. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 372, 388 (1994) (requiring a “rough
proportionality” between the development exactions and the government’s interest in
regulation).
176. Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 81-83.
177. Id. at 80-81.
178. Id. at 81-82. (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546-47 (2005)).
179. Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 82.
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dismiss the derivative claims for lack of standing.180 The court granted the
motion, dismissing the claims related to the ML III transactions and to the
taking of the economic and voting rights in the shares, as far as they
constituted derivative claims.181 Starr had initially claimed that the demand
requirement was excused as futile because the Government had controlled
AIG, so its appointees to the Board could not be expected to join a
derivative suit against the United States.182 However, after the Government
had disposed of its controlling shares, Starr had agreed on September 5,
2012 to make a demand on AIG’s board, but reserved the right to challenge
AIG’s subsequent refusal.183 AIG’s board ultimately refused the demand
after extensive discussion by it and its Regulatory, Compliance and Public
Policy Committee; counsel by three separate law firms; and briefings from
all parties involved.184 AIG’s board being entitled to business judgment
protection,185 Starr had a high bar to meet in arguing that the demand was
futile.
In rendering this decision, the court was quick to point out its
concerns. It was concerned about AIG’s use of experts’ opinions to
evaluate Starr’s likelihood of success, without those experts possessing all
the facts in a very fact-dependent case, and the role of the US Treasury’s
briefings.186 Most notably, however, the court pointed out the “media
frenzy” that accompanied AIG’s demand discussions, and admonished
those “public figures and elected officials who apparently lacked any
understanding that AIG was required to consider entry into the

180. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 459, 465 (2013). The Government
also moved to dismiss all of Starr’s other claims. Id. “[T]o have standing to sue
individually, rather than derivatively on behalf of the corporation, the plaintiff must allege
more than an injury resulting from a wrong to the corporation.” Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus.,
546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988).
181. Starr Int’l Co. II, 111 Fed. Cl. at 482-83.
182. Id. at 464. To pursue a derivative claim, a shareholder must either demand that the
corporation’s board of directors pursue the claim and receive a wrongful refusal, or argue
that the demand is excused for futility because the directors are conflicted. Wood v. Baum,
953 A.2d 136, 140 (Del. 2008).
183. Exhibit A: Agreement By And Between Starr International Co., Inc. and American
International Group, Inc. 2-3, Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50 (2012) (No.
11-779C) [hereinafter “Demand Agreement”]. The circumstances of that agreement are not
clear. Starr must have believed it had a chance to convince AIG to join its suit and wanted to
make it easier for AIG to hear its argument. See id. at 3 (explaining that the parties intention
was “to provide the AIG Board with sufficient time to consider all of the derivative claims
in an orderly process and to avoid a preliminary dispute concerning the demand excused
issue.”).
184. Starr Int’l Co. II, 111 Fed. Cl. at 467-69.
185. Id. at 465.
186. Id.
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lawsuit . . . .”187 Despite these concerns and the public pressure on AIG’s
board to refuse the suit, the court granted the motion to dismiss on these
claims.
3. Takeaways from the court’s opinion
The Starr case provides both an indication of how courts analyze this
new breed of takings claims and an example of how takings claims may be
used to replace a lack of state fiduciary law. Much of the court’s opinion is
devoted to analyzing whether Starr held a property interest that could even
be taken. The Court of Federal Claims went to great lengths to assemble a
property right in the shares and collateral payments, looking to both first
principles of excludability and transferability, along with Delaware case
law. The court also rested significant reasoning on the Consent Order from
the Court of Chancery, which it interpreted to require a vote on any dilution
of the common shareholders’ stake in AIG. Given this case-specific
reasoning, courts may not be able to generalize from it in the next case
without difficulty.
The court’s willingness to engage in this extensive exercise
demonstrates how critical the problem of the government as controlling
shareholder is. Mr. Greenburg and his attorney, David Boies, have been
clear with the media, as well as the court, about the policy implications of
the case.188 Public sentiment, however, is clearly not on their side.189 Not
only does the action seem ungrateful, but it also seems misplaced. If
187. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Neal Irwin, AIG Considers Suing Government
for Bailing it out, World Implodes in on Itself, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2013, 11:29 AM,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/08/aig-considers-suinggovernment-for-bailing-it-out-world-implodes-in-on-itself/ (noting the “head-smacking
disbelief that has accompanied public discourse of the news [of AIG’s potential lawsuit],”
focusing on comments by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke); Steve Schaefer, AIG:
Thank You America, But We May Sue You, FORBES, Jan. 8, 2013, 9:05 AM,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2013/01/08/aig-thank-you-america-but-we-maysue-you/ (noting that AIG’s board had a duty to its shareholders to consider joining the suit).
188. See Matthew J. Belvedere, Suing US Over AIG Bailout Is Solid, Says Lawyer,
CNBC, Jan. 10, 2013, 11:49 AM, http://www.cnbc.com/id/100369044 (noting that Boies
told CNBC that the case “is a test of the limits on what the government can demand in
return for making loans.”); Zachary Tracer & Elizabeth Bunn, Boies Likens AIG Takeover to
Firefighters
Seizing
Goods,
BLOOMBERG,
Jan.
10,
2013,
9:13
AM,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-10/boies-likens-aig-takeover-to-firefightersseizing-goods.html (“[Mr. Boies] . . . said the firm’s takeover was an abuse of authority
similar to firefighters seizing possessions they rescued from a flood.”).
189. See Phillips, supra note 3 (“The company’s true mistake wasn’t letting the
government cram an onerous deal down its throat, it was thinking that it could insure
billions worth of corporate debt the same way it insured cars and houses. Sometimes you
get what you deserve.”).
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shareholders have a problem with a company’s financial straits, they should
blame their directors, not the government. The court, however, seems to
understand the lack of protections shareholders have in cases of
government bailouts and is, therefore, not so willing to dismiss the suit.
The litigants may not be entirely sympathetic, but that is no reason to create
bad law.
The court defined the case largely within the Penn Central test, rather
than step beyond the current law and expanded the Dolan rough
proportionality test. Dolan’s test protects property owners from the
government’s imposition of unconstitutional conditions on discretionary
public benefits.190 The court was in accord with precedent to dismiss its
application. Furthermore, adding yet another cumbersome test would have
significantly impaired the government’s ability to negotiate with potential
bailout recipients, especially if the court was unclear as to which test would
apply. Declining to extend the rough proportionality test gives the
government a little more certainty as to how a court will review its actions.
If subsequent cases follow the same path, only “total taking[s]”191 and the
Penn Central factors will apply to define a taking.
Finally, the issues related to demand excusal raise an additional
procedural hurdle for a potential takings plaintiff. In this case, a “rigorous
review process and . . . a reasonable decision” were sufficient to uphold a
refusal under business judgment review.192 Even stoking the court’s
concerns about the public and governmental pressure on the board was not
enough to defeat the presumption.193 While those forces emanate from
outside the boardroom, they could have a real effect on a company’s ability
to generate value to shareholders, yet they are not enough to establish
futility.
III. COMPARING DELAWARE FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND TAKINGS CLAIMS
OUTCOMES

The lifecycle of government ownership in a given firm can be divided
into three stages: acquisition, management, and disposition. The court’s
opinion in Starr relates most clearly to the acquisition stage of the lifecycle,
190. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 372, 385 (1994) (“Under the well-settled
doctrine of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’ the government may not require a person to give
up a constitutional right . . . in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the
government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.”).
191. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
192. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 459, 466 (2013); see also Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (1984) (noting that analysis of demand futility is bound to an
analysis under the business judgment rule).
193. Starr Int’l Co. II, 111 Fed. Cl. at 477-79.
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which is the most natural fit for a takings claim. Takings may also provide
some protection for shareholders in duty of loyalty fact patterns and where
the company is sold, but on the whole, it is an inadequate substitute for
fiduciary law. The fact patterns outlined below track some of the common
breaches of fiduciary duties and analyze the outcomes under the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause. In many of these cases, shareholders could
have a claim against the board of directors. In cases of government
ownership like Starr, however, shareholders are seeking compensation that
does not involve the company. Furthermore, the damages could be so large
as to make the board judgment-proof.194 Therefore, while shareholders
may have a cause of action against the board, this section will address
whether the minority shareholders would have a takings claim against the
government on the same facts.
A. Stage One: Acquisition
Starr itself presents the acquisition scenario. The Court of Federal
Claims has now opened the door to a compensable taking following the
government’s acquisition of common shares (given a certain set of facts).
Allowing these claims, however, diverges from Delaware law in that
fiduciary law does not impose a burden on the buyer of shares until the
acquisition is complete. The Delaware courts have developed a doctrine by
which minority shareholders may seek damages when a corporation’s
board of directors issues shares for less than their value.195 That doctrine,
however, imposes a duty on the board, not on the buyer. Generally, the
buyer has no fiduciary duties to the corporation or its shareholders until she
has taken control. In this way, takings may actually provide an additional
layer of shareholder protection not offered by fiduciary law.
B. Stage Two: Management
Fiduciary law issues also arise in the ongoing management of a
corporation. These duties encompass loyalty to the corporation, care in
conduct of affairs, and additional protections of shareholder franchise. The
Fifth Amendment fails to protect shareholders to the extent that state
fiduciary law does. Even where the substantive law might contain
comparable safeguards, as in the duty of loyalty cases, the procedural
requirements may prevent adequate redress of shareholder injury.

194. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 69, at 48 (seeking not less than twenty-five billion
dollars in damages).
195. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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1. Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty protects the interests of the shareholders from selfserving actions of management. Even if fiduciary law did apply to the
government, actions taken for the public good would likely not be seen as
self-serving. However, if the controlling shareholder is on both sides of a
given transaction, then there might be a cognizable duty of loyalty claim.196
For example, imagine the government owns a majority stake in two
American auto companies, AMC and BMC, and controls both boards.
Following the government bailout in which it obtained its equity stake,
AMC’s business has turned around, yet BMC continues to struggle. Citing
a public need for at least two strong auto companies on its shores, the
government directs AMC to sell some of its top income-producing assets,
valued at $500 million to BMC. In exchange, BMC issues $1,000 in highyield debt to AMC.197 The board convenes no independent negotiating
committee and hires no independent counsel or financial experts. The
majority of the disinterested directors vote against the merger, though the
board still approves the deal. Just to be safe, the board submits the deal to
shareholders,198 which is purely a formality, since the government’s shares
carry the vote.
Given this scenario, a non-government controlling shareholder would
likely be held to have breached its duty of loyalty because the price and
process are clearly unfair.199 A takings claim, however, would be much
more difficult. The government’s action would deprive the shareholders of
the economic value of the AMC assets, to the extent that the corporation
was not compensated through the BMC bonds. The shareholders likely
invested in the company with the expectation that their best assets would
not be given away for next to nothing. Furthermore, the government’s
action has the character of a taking, in that it is moving the asset from a
corporation under its control to another corporation under its control,
depriving the AMC shareholders at the benefit of BMC’s shareholders and
the public at large.
The assets here—likely manufacturing plants, brands, and materials—
are certainly property interests of the corporation. AMC can exclude others
from their use and transfer them to whomever it chooses. Under the Starr
196. Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 442 (Del. 1996).
197. In order to conduct this secondary bailout of BMC, the transaction necessarily must
be unfair. AMC cannot transfer its assets to BMC at their true net present value because it
would defeat the purpose of the transfer.
198. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (West 2014) (requiring a shareholder vote for
sales of “all or substantially all . . . assets.”).
199. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (requiring entire
fairness review for duty of loyalty claims against controlling shareholders).
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reasoning, the shareholders would likely not be able to maintain a direct
claim against the government.
In this hypothetical scenario, the
government caused AMC to transfer its best assets in exchange for very
little consideration from BMC. As in Gatz and Rossette, the controlling
shareholder received the benefit from the transaction at the expense of the
other shareholders.200 This hypothetical deal did not, however, involve
compensation in the form of stock, and the Delaware courts have been
largely unwilling to extend the equity dilution too far.201 Therefore, unless
the shareholder-plaintiff can meet the standards for demand excusal, the
claim would not be sustained. The Court of Federal Claims, however, may
be more willing to allow a direct suit where the plaintiff merely “seek[s]
compensation for the improper extraction of the economic value” of his
shares,202 even if the factual predicates are not fully established. Therefore,
a takings claim may be sustained, although it is not clear through which
procedural hurdles a shareholder-plaintiff would have to jump.203
2. The Business Judgment Rule & the Duty of Care
Corporate law’s business judgment rule provides extensive protections
for board decisions in the interest of allowing for risk-taking and avoiding
recurrent litigation following failed business ventures. In reviewing a
challenged course of action, the court
presum[es] that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.204
Unless the plaintiff can rebut that presumption by showing a breach of the
duty of care or duty of loyalty, “[A] court will not substitute its judgment
for that of the board if the . . . decision can be attributed to any rational
business purpose.”205 A shareholder may show a breach of the duty of care
200. Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 925 A.2d 1265, 1280-81 (Del. 2007); Gentile v. Rossette, 906
A.2d 91, 102-03 (Del. 2006).
201. See, e.g., Feldman v. Cutaia, 956 A.2d 644, 658 (Del. Ch. 2007) (refusing to
aggregate the shares held by a company’s directors to find a control block).
202. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 65 (2012).
203. AIG has declined to join Starr’s suit against the United States, jeopardizing Starr’s
derivative claims. Michael J. De La Merced, Greenberg Forges Ahead With Lawsuit Over
A.I.G.
Bailout,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK,
Mar.
12,
2013,
2:06
PM,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/greenberg-forges-ahead-with-lawsuit-over-a-i-gbailout.
204. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 705-06 (Del. 2009) (internal quotations
omitted).
205. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (internal

MORRIS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

926

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

6/3/14 10:22 AM

[Vol. 16:3

if the board of directors acted unadvisedly.206
At one point in the history of regulatory takings, courts may have been
willing to judge how well the taking accomplished its public purpose.
Agins v. City of Tiburon set forth a standard for a compensable taking,
stating that “[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular property
effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests.”207 The Supreme Court, however, later rejected the test,
criticizing it as derived from the Due Process clause and not fit for a
takings analysis.208 The problem with the test, the Court said, was that it
“suggests a means-end test: [i]t asks, in essence, whether a regulation of
private property is effective in achieving some legitimate public
purpose.”209 Furthermore, it “reveals nothing about the magnitude or
character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private
property rights.”210 As a practical matter,
[t]he Agins formula can be read to demand heightened means-end
review of virtually any regulation of private property. If so
interpreted, it would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a
vast array of state and federal regulations — a task for which
courts are not well suited.211
Just as the Delaware courts will not second-guess decisions of the board
within the requirements of the business judgment rule, takings claims do
not present an opportunity for a court to impose its ex post decision-making
on the government. Likewise, takings do not require that the government
acted advisedly. Those judgments are left to the realm of the due process
claims. Thus, under the Takings Clause, the government enjoys a similar
insulation from attacks on its decision-making, but it is not subject to an
attack that it acted without requisite knowledge.
3. Protection of Shareholder Votes
Although the Delaware courts have time and again recognized the
quotations omitted).
206. See Gantler, 965 A.2d at 706 (noting that a board must act advisedly for its
decision to be entitled to the business judgment presumption). In the context of a merger,
for example, the Court of Chancery will generally require that the board have received
opinions from both legal counsel and financial experts, such as investment banker(s). See
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872, 876-878 (Del. 1985) (insisting on expert
opinions to aid the board of directors).
207. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
208. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
209. Id. at 542 (emphasis in original).
210. Id. (emphasis in original).
211. Id. at 544.
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importance of protecting the shareholder franchise, shareholders are
unlikely to find similar protections in cases of government control.
Delaware has established that the business judgment rule does not attach to
those actions of a board of directors done with the “primary purpose” of
interfering with a shareholder vote.212 Rather than the lenient business
judgment rule standard, the board must provide a “compelling justification”
for any such action.213 Similarly, the Court of Federal Claims recognized a
property interest in the voting power of shares under certain circumstances.
Under Delaware law, shareholders are frequently entitled to a vote.214
Starr’s companion complaint in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York presented a similar claim for breach of
fiduciary law.215 Starr argued that the reverse stock split was brought about
for the primary purpose of circumventing the class-wise vote that would
have been required to increase the number of authorized shares.216 The
court dismissed on the dual basis that Starr had not alleged adequate
control of the Federal Reserve Bank and that fiduciary duties do not apply
to agencies of the United States.217
A shareholder may have a claim against a private board of directors in
the same situation, though it is not clear that Blasius would apply. In
recent years, the Delaware courts have narrowed the applicability of the
Blasius rule to the point that it may only apply to director elections.218
Furthermore, the court normally applies it to scenarios where a vote is
altogether circumvented. In the alleged scenario, the shareholders did

212. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 662 (Del. Ch. 1988); see also
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 440 (Del. 1971) (reversing the denial of a
request for an injunction against a corporation’s plan to change the date of an annual
stockholders meeting); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 777 (Del. Ch.
1967) (finding a violation of fiduciary duty where the corporation issued stock for the
purpose of diluting a shareholder’s interest in the company).
213. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661.
214. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (West 2014) (providing for a shareholder
vote on mergers); Id. at § 271 (requiring a shareholder vote for a sale of “all or substantially
all of [the corporation’s] property and assets.”).
215. Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 906 F. Supp. 2d 202, 211-12
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
216. Id. at 214.
217. Id. at 214-15.
218. See Mercier v. Inter-Tel Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 809 (Del. Ch. 2007) (interpreting MM
Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003) “as signaling . . . that the
stringency of the Blasius approach should be reserved largely for director election contests
or election contests having consequences for corporate control.”); see also City of Westland
Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Axcelis Techs., Inc., 1 A.3d 281, 289 (Del. 2010) (declining to
extend Blasius to the context of Section 220 inspection requests); Yucaipa Am. Alliance
Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 330-336 (Del. Ch. 2010) (declining to extend Blasius to
the adoption of a poison pill).
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approve the reverse stock split via the proxy vote, although the
government’s controlling shares participated.219 A Delaware court may,
however, apply equitable doctrines to find a breach of fiduciary duty.220 In
this scenario, AIG purportedly recommended the reverse stock split due to
the risk of de-listing.221 If the genuine, primary purpose were to avoid the
vote on the increase to authorized shares, then the court may find a breach
of fiduciary duty.
Starr’s suit in the Court of Federal Claims advances a takings claim on
the same facts. Insofar as a litigant can claim a property right in his
franchise, he would likely have a viable takings claim that would apply in
more cases than Blasius would. That property right, however, is unlikely to
arise in most cases of government control. The court was willing to accept
the pleading of a property right in a class-wise vote based on AIG’s
previous representations to the Court of Chancery.222 Delaware corporate
law does entitle shareholders to a vote in other cases, such as in cases of an
increase in the number of authorized shares223 or in mergers where the
shareholder’s corporation will not survive,224 which would be sufficient to
create a property right. If the government, however, already holds a
controlling position via common shares, then it has little reason to
circumvent a shareholder vote. Furthermore, even if the government held
preferred shares, Delaware law does not generally provide for a class vote.
In the case of amendments to the authorized shares, however, the Delaware
code does provide for a class-wise vote.
In Starr, however, the shareholders did receive a vote on the
amendment to the certificate of incorporation, but the reverse stock split
diluted their shares with the government’s vote controlling. The Court of
Federal Claims held that Starr adequately pleaded a property right in a
class-wise vote on the government’s conversion to common shares based
on AIG’s representations in the Court of Chancery.225 Absent those
representations, the shareholders may not have a property right in a classwise vote, unless the Delaware statutes so provide.226 Therefore, the

219. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 58 (2012).
220. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)
(providing the oft-quoted principle that because a course of action is legally possible does
not mean it is permissible).
221. See Russnow, supra note 86 (explaining AIG’s “rationale” for the reverse stock
split: “if the stock falls below a dollar . . . the New York Stock Exchange may delist
them.”).
222. Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 73.
223. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (West 2014).
224. Id. at § 251.
225. Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 73.
226. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (West 2014) (establishing that “holders of

MORRIS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

WHEN A BAILOUT IS A TAKING

6/3/14 10:22 AM

929

common shareholders may have a claim in the most egregious cases, such
as the government completely disregarding a vote, but in the most likely
cases they will not have a cognizable takings claim.
C. Stage Three: Disposition
The government’s inevitable discharge of its ownership stake or the
sale of the corporation itself presents the clearest need for adequate
protections for share value. The Delaware courts have recognized the need
to scrutinize these transactions between private parties. In the context of
government ownership, however, shareholders continue to face significant
hurdles in the protection of their investments. In these cases, the
shareholders may have a takings claim.
Since these claims will often be derivative, however, the plaintiffs will
be required to fulfill the demand requirements. The pressures from outside
the boardroom noted in the Starr opinion make it seem as if the plaintiff
should never make the demand on the board.227 However, the standard for
excusal is not much more forgiving.228 Given these circumstances, suits
arising from the sale of corporate property will face difficult procedural
hurdles.
1. Sale of Control
Fiduciary issues involving the sale of control divide into two major
categories: (1) the sale of control to a corporate raider and (2) selling the
board or a corporate asset. Courts will generally find a breach of fiduciary
duty when the controlling shareholder reaps a premium, usually a
conspicuously large payment, to a party whom the seller should have
known was going to raid the corporation’s assets in bad faith.229 The
the outstanding shares of a class shall be entitled to vote as a class upon a proposed
amendment . . . ”).
227. See Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 459, 470 (2013) (“In making a
demand on the board, a shareholder not only tacitly concedes [the] lack of self-interest and
independence of a majority of the Board, but expressly concedes both issues.”) (internal
quotations omitted).
228. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) (stating that the plaintiff
must allege “particularized facts [to create] a reasonable doubt . . . that: (1) the directors are
disinterested and independent and (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product
of a valid exercise of business judgment.”).
229. See e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 21 N.E.2d 331, 333-34 (N.Y. 1939) (holding that a
controlling shareholder may not sell his control stake for the purpose of personal gain);
Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 235 (Del. Ch. 1990) (holding that a shareholder selling
control breaches the duty of care if he “may or should reasonably foresee danger to other
shareholders.”).
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government is unlikely to sell its controlling share to a party who will
destroy the company it had worked hard to revive, so a takings claim based
on those facts is unlikely.
Scholars used to debate the characterization of the control premium.
Professor Berle argued that control itself was a corporate asset, the
premium for which should be vested in the corporation.230 Under that view,
shareholders may have a cognizable takings claim for the sale of control
itself. However, the courts have largely rejected that view and will allow a
controlling shareholder to accept a control premium, which he does not
have to share with the minority shareholders.231 A premium may be
invalidated, however, if it reflects the sale of the board232 or the sale of a
corporate asset.233
The government, however, may still run into a problem if it appears to
be selling the board alone, which can arise when the shareholder receives
too high a premium given the number of shares being sold. Fiduciary law
accepts that a control of the board will inevitably follow the sale of a
significant percentage of shares such that, for example, an agreement that
existing directors will resign and appoint their successors is not illegal per
se.234 If that ownership percentage falls below the amount whereby control
would inevitably flow, however, then it is deemed to be the selling the
board itself.235 The government could find itself in this position if it has
drawn down its equity stake below a legally controlling amount, yet still
230. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 216-19 (1932). But see Thomas L. Hazen, Transfers of Corporate
Control and Duties of Controlling Shareholders — Common Law, Tender Offers,
Investment Companies — and a Proposal for Reform, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (1977)
(explaining some of the critiques of Berle’s position).
231. See Abraham v. Emerson Radio Co., 901 A.2d 751, 761-62 (Del. Ch. 2006)
(“[P]ure control premium envy is not a cognizable claim for a minority stockholder under
Delaware law.”); Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387, 389 (1979) (stating that
minority stockholders are not entitled to the opportunity to share equally in any premium
paid for a controlling interest in the corporation).
232. See Brecher v. Gregg, 89 Misc. 457, 464 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (holding that a four
percent shareholder who received a control premium was required to forfeit the premium to
the company).
233. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1955) (invalidating a control
premium where it reflected the sale of the going concern value of the company).
234. See, e.g., Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 579 (2d Cir. 1962)
(holding that contract for sale of 28.3% of stock of a publicly held corporation, that included
a clause giving purchaser the option to require seriatim director resignation, was not invalid
per se as a matter of state law).
235. See id. (requiring a minority shareholder challenging a sale “to show that . . . there
was at the time some concretely foreseeable reason why [the buyer’s] wishes would not
have prevailed in the shareholder voting held in due course.”); see also Brecher, 89 Misc. at
464 (invalidating promised resignations by a shareholder who only held four percent of
stock).
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maintains effective control of the board. This could arise when no other
shareholder holds a significant percentage of shares. The government may
want to pass control of the board to a shareholder that will not unwind its
work with the company. Furthermore, it would likely be under public
pressure to break even, at least, on the bailout transaction. For these
reasons, the government may hypothetically negotiate a premium in
exchange for the current board’s appointment of the purchaser’s designated
directors.
With any other seller, shareholders would likely have a derivative
claim under fiduciary law for the sale of the board with the premium
proceeds paid back to the company.236 A takings claim would likely also
be derivative because the defendant normally pays the excess premium for
the sale of control back to the company. Value alone, however, is not
enough to confer property status.237 Shareholders generally maintain the
right to elect directors.238 The company cannot transfer the board seats to
anyone it wants or for any compensation it wants, as a shareholder can
generally override the board’s appointment of directors, given enough
shares. On the one hand, Delaware law seems to recognize a property
interest in the voting rights of shares.239 The sale of a board seat obstructs
the exercise of those rights by circumventing an election. On the other
hand, the voting power of the shares is not permanently affected, as the
shareholder could hypothetically exercise his vote at the next shareholder’s
meeting. The Fifth Amendment, however, does not distinguish between
temporary and permanent takings.240 Shareholders would likely have a
takings claim where the government merely sells board seats.
2. Sale of the Company
The sale of the entire company presents the clearest need for
shareholder protections. A merger will force a payout price on the
shareholders, who depend on the board to find the best bid. Delaware
fiduciary law accordingly imposes a duty on the board to maximize
shareholder value when the Board or controlling shareholder is selling the
company.241 Delaware will also employ an entire fairness standard of
236. Brecher, 89 Misc. at 464 (“[T]he illegal profit belongs to the corporation.”).
237. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 157 (1998).
238. Under Delaware law, at least one class of stock must be entitled to vote. Each
share receives one vote unless otherwise specified. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (West
2014).
239. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
240. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., Cal.,
482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987).
241. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del.
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review if the controlling shareholder forces a merger on the minority
shareholders without a special negotiating committee, disinterested director
approval, or a majority vote by disinterested shareholders.242
Recall our struggling auto companies. The government has purchased
a controlling stake in the common shares of a failing American auto
company. The majority of the directors have strong ties to the government,
and they are not considered disinterested or independent. After a period of
time, the government decides it cannot turn the company around on its own
and, overturning a long history of independence, determines that a merger
with another auto company would be the best option. After initial bidding
from two major American automakers (which it does not control), the
government strikes a deal for a cash-out merger. Before the shareholders
meeting, however, a foreign car company makes a significantly higher, allcash bid. The government does not want to weather the political firestorm
that would ensue if it were seen to be selling off a great American asset. It
further believes that the employees would fare better under a domestic
company, which will keep plants open in the country. For those reasons
only, it rejects the bid, recommending the initial deal to the shareholders
and voting its shares in favor.
A private board would most likely be held to have violated its
fiduciary duties.243
Revlon established that consideration of “nonstockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders
is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the
corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.”244 In this scenario,
the board, controlled by the government, has put the company on the
auction block, triggering the duty to maximize shareholder value.
Furthermore, the government, as shareholder, failed to achieve a fair price
through fair process because it decided to forgo a higher premium for
1987) (“[A] shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority interest in or
exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation.”); see also McMullin v. Beran,
765 A.2d 910, 919 (Del. 2000) (asserting, “When a board is presented with the majority
shareholder’s proposal to sell the entire corporation to a third party, the ultimate focus on
value maximization is the same as if the board itself had decided to sell the corporation to a
third party.”); Kahn v. Lynch Commc’ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113-14 (Del. 1994)
(explaining that, in Delaware, a minority shareholder who exercises control over the
corporation owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation and other shareholders).
242. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (imposing an entire
fairness review where the controlling shareholder pushes through a merger transaction);
Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117 (deciding that the use of a special negotiating committee shifts the
entire fairness burden to the plaintiff).
243. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182-83
(Del. 1986) (requiring the board to maximize shareholder value when it initiates an active
bidding process).
244. Id. at 182.
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reasons other than its minority shareholders. If fiduciary law applied, the
government would have breached its duties when it decided to favor
workers and politics over shareholders.245
The minority shareholders could have a takings claim in this fact
pattern. The government is taking their shares for public use in exchange
for inadequate compensation. The court would likely see this as a “total
taking”246 since the shareholders are permanently and completely deprived
of their shares, but the Penn Central factors also point to a taking. The
economic impact to the shareholders could be immense. Furthermore,
given the Revlon rule, shareholders likely had an expectation, at the time of
investment, that the company’s board of directors will seek to maximize
the value of their shares in any merger agreement. Those expectations
might, however, be different if shareholders purchased their shares after the
government had taken control.247 Since the shares are personal property
under Delaware law,248 the property requirement would not be at issue. A
stock-for-stock deal would similarly result in a complete taking of the
shares. Minority shareholders, however, would have a greater burden to
prove inadequate compensation because they could sell the shares.249
Therefore, the Takings Clause likely provides substantive protections in the
merger context similar to Delaware fiduciary law. The remedies for these
takings, however, would likely fall short of what a shareholder would seek
under a claim for breach of fiduciary duties.
D. A Brief Note on Remedies
The remedies available in a takings claim generally are not the kinds
of remedies that a shareholder would seek in Chancery. Particularly in
cases of mergers, shareholders will seek an injunction to stop the actions of
the board of directors or controlling shareholder. The Takings Clause,
however, does not prohibit the taking altogether, but only requires
compensation.250 In some cases of private control, such as in cases of
squeeze-out mergers, the minority shareholders will similarly have no right
to an injunction. The Delaware courts, however, have provided for a
245. See id. (“A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its
responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”).
246. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
247. The shareholders may have had no expectation of value maximization if they
expected fiduciary duties not to apply to the government.
248. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 159 (West 2014).
249. The same rationale underlies Delaware’s denial of appraisal rights where the
shareholders hold stock that were either publicly or widely traded. Id. at § 262(b)(1).
250. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., Cal.,
482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987).
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“quasi-appraisal” remedy beyond the statutory appraisal procedures.251 Just
compensation under the Takings Clause is “normally . . . measured by the
market value of the property at the time of the taking contemporaneously
paid in money.”252 “Deviation from this measure of just compensation has
been required only when market value has been too difficult to find, or
when its application would result in manifest injustice to [the] owner or
public.”253 In some cases, the fair market value is easy to find, such as a
merger where the government declines a topping bid. In other cases,
however, where no market test has been performed, finding the fair market
value may be more difficult. Weinberger v. UOP is famous for opening
valuation to “any techniques or methods which are generally considered
acceptable in the financial community . . . .”254 Modern financial analysts
generally use discounted cash-flow analysis. Those techniques, however,
may be unacceptable in the takings context.255 Therefore, even if minority
shareholders can find a sustainable takings claim, the relief available may
not satisfy them.256
CONCLUSION
The Takings Clause provides an important backstop to highly
inequitable government action, but it is unlikely to solve effectively the
problem of the government as controlling shareholder. In some ways, it
provides protections not available under Delaware fiduciary law in that it
imposes burdens on the government’s initial acquisition of shares. It also
provides critical protections in the merger and duty of loyalty contexts,
when the shareholders are most vulnerable. In other areas, it falls short.
While it provides a right to adequate compensation in a merger, a
shareholder will not be able to secure injunctive relief. The duty of loyalty
protections can become mired in procedural difficulties, and the duty of
care protections are completely absent. And where the substantive law is
most applicable, as in the sale of the company cases, the procedural

251. See Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) (applying a “quasiappraisal” where a majority shareholder forced a merger transaction on minority
shareholders without fair price or fair process).
252. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (internal quotations
omitted).
253. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
254. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
255. See, e.g., Metlyn Realty Corp. v. Esmark, Inc., 763 F.2d 826, 836 (7th Cir. 1985)
(“Cash flow studies may be necessary when there is no other way to find value, but they are
not the best way.”).
256. See J.W. Verret, supra note 8, at 309 (noting that shareholders seeking an
injunction will be disappointed).
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requirements and remedies can make sufficient relief impossible.
Courts walk a fine line in bailout cases, and the stakes are high. On
the one hand, the court must protect the constitutional right of private
parties to receive adequate compensation whenever the government takes
its property. On the other hand, the court must be mindful not to impose
too high a standard such that it impairs the government’s ability to save the
national economy in times of crisis. Starr exposes that tension. While the
public clearly will not shed a tear for the plaintiff, the pleadings expose a
government that may have asked for too much in return for its aid.
The best protection for shareholders must come from the government
protecting shareholders from itself. A well-planned bailout can protect the
interests of shareholders such that the shortcomings of the Takings Clause
are never exposed. Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have
suggested certain designs that would “block political interference by
reducing the power to interfere, minimizing the opportunities to do so, and
increasing the political cost.”257 They suggest that the government insulate
itself from the ongoing business of the corporation by investing in debt
rather than equity or “through a legally binding process for the appointment
of directors and the voting of shares.”258 Furthermore, they note that
“[b]inding time limits on government ownership are the single most
powerful means of insulating firms from political pressure.”259
J.W. Verret goes a step further to suggest that the Department of
Treasury might set up fiduciary principles for the conduct of a bailout,
together with an effective process to sue for violations of those rules.260
Rather than investing through equity or bonds, Verret suggests the
government hold “frozen options” to “limit the inherent drawbacks to the
Treasury holding common equity, while also letting the taxpayer
participate in the benefits of the bailout . . . .”261 Like Kahan and Rock,
Verret also recommends “a clear timeline for [Government] ownership
of . . . stocks through a sunset provision . . . subject to challenge if the

257. Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1360.
258. Id. at 1361.
259. Id. at 1363. The authors recognize, however, that the quick exits come with
tradeoffs. Specifically, if Congress forces the government to pull out too soon, it could
undo the work done to save the company. Id.
260. Verret, supra note 8, at 346 (citing as precedent “the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC), established to effectuate a government bailout of the savings and loan industry,
[which] was created by enabling legislation that significantly waived sovereign immunity.”).
Beneficiaries of the RTC were able to sue the RTC for breaches of the fiduciary rules
established in the legislation. Id. at 346-47.
261. Id. at 347. “[Frozen options] are options to purchase common stock that
governments are not permitted to exercise, but which subsequent purchasers in the market
are permitted to exercise.” Id.
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Treasury later changes its mind.”262 He additionally suggests that the
Treasury establish a clear sales plan for how it will unwind its ownership.263
If the Government chooses to implement these suggestions, shareholders
will not have to rely on the ill-suited provisions of the Takings Clause.
This Comment has sought to address the extent to which the Takings
Clause can protect shareholders as well as state fiduciary law. The Court
of Federal Claims, however, will have the first official statement in Starr.
Whatever its ultimate conclusion, it has already taken the position that,
given the right facts, there can be a cognizable takings claim. But Starr
presents only a fraction of potential takings scenarios. While takings
claims can provide an important stopgap in the most egregious cases of
government overreach, the doctrine largely falls short of protecting
shareholders’ investments.

262. Id. at 350.
263. Id.

